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THE ADMINISTRATION'S ANTI-LITERACY TEST BILL: 
WHOLLY CONSTITUTIONAL BUT 
WHOLLY INADEQUATE 
William W. Van Alstyne* 
THE nature of American national government has undergone a profound metamorphosis, moving from the near oligarchy 
which characterized the system as established in 1789 to the imper-
fectly representative government which it is today. At the time the 
Constitution was ratified, all restrictions then imposed by the sev-
eral states on the right to vote for state and federal electors were 
preserved.1 These various limitations on the franchise restricted 
the active body politic to approximately four percent of the total 
population.2 Disfranchisement applied then, as now, to those 
under twenty-one, 3 to those lacking sufficient residence in a given 
community, to the insane, and to the criminally confined. It 
applied also to all females, to virtually all Negroes (including 
many who were not slaves),4 to most who were not endowed with 
a freehold estate, to many not owning substantial personal prop-
erty, and to those of particular religious convictions. 
Since 1789, the franchise has been greatly extended through 
a series of seven amendments to the Constitution. 5 And within 
the past six years, Congress has twice enacted laws affecting the 
right to vote.6 These recent legislative enactments, however, were 
designed only for the more efficient protection of persons already 
qualified to vote according to state laws. They have cast no re-
flection on the older constitutional tradition that the states may 
generally limit the federal electorate by fixing voter qualifications 
according to the local prevailing majority's notion of limited rep-
resentative government.7 And, for nearly one hundred years, 
• Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University.-Ed. 
1 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 360 (Wright ed. 1961) (Madison); 
id. No. 60, at 402 (Hamilton). 
2 See BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 66-69 (1893); MCGOVNEY, 
THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 11-26 (1949) [hereinafter cited as McGoVNEY); MILLER, 
A NEW HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 109-12 (1958); PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 4-6, 14 (1918); 1959 U.S. Co:MM'N ON CIVlL RIGHTS REP. 19-26. 
3 The current exceptions being Georgia (eighteen), Kentucky (eighteen), and Alaska 
(nineteen). 
4 M:cGoVNEY 17. 
r:; U.S. CoNsr. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, and XXIV (proposed). 
6 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.); 
Ci\'il Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.). 
7 See note 1 supra; Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 
(1959); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 
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there has been no congressional attempt to expand the franchise 
without recourse to amending the Constitution.8 Indeed, after 
several years of unsuccessful attempts to eliminate poll tax quali-
fications by legislation alone,9 recourse has been taken once again 
to the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment.10 As a 
consequence of this tradition and the language of the Constitution 
itself, 11 it is generally presumed that incursions by the national 
government into the area of the states' power to limit the right to 
vote can be made only by the mechanism of constitutional amend-
ment. 
In the last session of Congress, however, extraordinary com-
mittee deliberation and floor debate resurrected the controversy 
over whether Congress might further extend the franchise without 
constitutional amendment.12 The argument arose in connection 
with Senate Bill 2750 which seemingly would forbid states from 
requiring literacy, education, intelligence, or understanding qual-
ifications above that level represented by a sixth-grade education. 
In the short run, the controversy engendered by the bill appeared 
to be entirely out of proportion to the probable impact of the 
proposed law itself. Although twenty states currently require some 
(1917); Guinn 8e Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 
213 (1898); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
8 Various Reconstruction statutes affecting Negro suffrage were enacted prior to the 
adoption of the fifteenth amendment, but only a few of these remain and none attempt 
to confer the right to vote on persons not otherwise qualified according to state laws or 
protected by constitutional amendment. 
The use of the fourteenth amendment to enfranchise Negroes [as in Nixon v. Herndon, 
273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)] has represented an unhistorical 
application of that amendment. The neglected provision in § 2 of the fourteenth amend· 
ment, that representation should be reduced to the extent that the male population over 
twenty-one is disenfranchised, clearly implied at the time that states were otherwise free 
to forbid Negroes from voting. See MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND jUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 11-19 (1909); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3027-28, 3039 (1866). 
9 See, e.g., S. 1734, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 29, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); 
H.R. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 1024 and S. 1280, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). 
10 The desultory character of the Southern filibuster against the amendment, and the 
fact that some of the states otherwise discriminating against Negroes do not have a poll 
tax (e.g., Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina), confirm suggestions that the 
poll tax amendment will be of little significance. See McGoVNEY 143-57; 1959 U.S. 
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 118. 
11 Section 2 of article I of the Constitution provides: "The House of Representatives 
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors 
of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." See also the seventeenth amend-
ment, supplanting art. I, § 3, and compare art. II, § 1, regarding the selection of President 
and Vice-President. 
12 Hearings on S. 480, S. 2750, and S. 2979 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter 
cited as Hearings]; 108 CoNe. REc. 6607 et seq. (daily ed. April 25, 1962). 
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literacy qualification,13 all but a few states have indicated that a 
sixth-grade ceiling would not hamper or invalidate their modest 
requirements.14 Nevertheless, the establishment of the broader 
principle of congressional interference would seem to invite limit-
less future forays into a domain which many regard as involving 
a basic states' right. It was therefore not surprising that an impos-
ing array of legal scholars was summoned by both sides to examine 
the constitutional implications of the bill. These discussions/5 to-
gether with earlier discussions occasioned by the anti-poll tax bills, 
are doubtless of great importance. They have sharpened national 
awareness of an unexplored congressional power. Acceptance of 
the proponents' arguments would open a broad avenue to hasten 
the trend toward more fully representative government in the 
United States.16 
Nevertheless, most of these discussions were quite unnecessary 
in the particular context of S. 2750. Indeed, the constitutional bur-
dens gratuitously assumed by many who supported the bill 
were themselves so great that they may have inadvertently es-
tranged some members of Congress who might otherwise be ex-
pected to support this type of legislation.17 
The purpose of this brief article is neither to recapitulate the 
broad constitutional issues on which others have ably written, nor 
to examine the arguments which can be made for enhanced con-
gressional control of the franchise. It is much narrower, intending 
only to assess the scope of S. 2750 which was co-sponsored by the 
majority and minority leaders/8 supported by the Administra-
tion, 10 and likely to be considered again; to demonstrate its un-
13 Hearings 144-45, 604 n.32; McGoVNEY 59-60; Ervin, Literacy Tests for Voters: A 
Case Study in Federalism, 27 LAw &: CoNTEl\!P, PRoB. 481, 483 (1962)-
14 Hearings 263, 276, 665-72. 
15 See notes 12 and 13 supra; Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: 
A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962); Maggs &: Wallace, 
Congress and Literacy Tests: A Comment on Constitutional Power and Legislative Ab-
negation, 27 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 510 (1962); Werdegar, The Constitutionality of 
Federal Legislation To Abolish Literacy Tests: Civil Rights Commission's 1961 Report on 
Voting, 30 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 723 (1962); Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 265 (1962); Note, 
46 ML'<N. L. REv. 1076 (1962)- See also 1 CROSSKEY, PoLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 522-41 
(1953). 
16 This is especially true of Dean Griswold's likening of the fifteenth amendment to 
the highly elastic commerce clause (Hearings 138-53), Professors Maggs' and Wallace's 
suggestion of an implied powers argument (supra note 15, at 517-23), Mr. Bonfield's able 
enlargement on Professor Crosskey's "republican form of government" theme (supra note 
15), and Professor Crosskey's own rendition of art. I, § 4 (op. cit. supra note 15). 
17 See Maggs &: Wallace, supra note 15, at 513-14. Representative Celler of New York, 
normally a stalwart on civil rights legislation, allegedly refused to support the House 
version of S. 2750 on grounds of its doubtful constitutionality. See N.Y. Times, March 13, 
1962, p. 25, col. I. 
18 108 CoNe. REc. 6615 (daily ed. April 25, 1962). 
19 Hearings 261; N.Y. Times, March 16, 1962, p. 19, col. 3. 
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remarkable constitutionality; and to comment briefly on the 
efficacy of the bill (assuming it may become law) to secure the 
franchise from racial discrimination. 
I. WHAT s. 2750 PROVIDES 
It has generally been assumed that S. 2750 would deprive states 
of the power to prescribe literacy, educational, intelligence, or un~ 
derstanding qualifications beyond a sixth-grade education. Senator 
Ervin, who presided at the hearings and who opened discussion 
of the bill, stated: "I feel that a particular State ... might reason-
ably and not arbitrarily conclude that a stricter requirement than 
a sixth-grade education is desirable. This bill would take from that 
State the right to make such a determination."20 The staff memo-
randum of the Civil Rights Commission appears to concur in this 
view,21 and others who contributed to the hearings manifested a 
similar impression.22 It may be seen, however, that these impres-
sions are inaccurate, and that S. 2750 does not affect the power of 
any state to set voter qualifications as high as it wishes. 
The pivotal provision of the bill is in section 2(b), which pro-
vides: 
"No person ... may subject any other person to the depriva-
tion of the right to vote in any Federal election .... 'Depriva-
tion of the right to vote' shall include but shall not be 
limited to (1) the application to any person of standards or 
procedures more stringent than are applied to others similarly 
situated23 and (2) the denial to any person otherwise qualified 
20 Hearings 30. 
21 Hearings 168: "[T)he bill does not go so far as to outlaw literacy tests; it merely 
declares that a sixth grade education in any public school, including those of Puerto 
Rico, is a sufficient demonstration of literacy." 
22 See, e.g., remarks of Professor Robert Dixon, Hearings 599: "A special vice of these 
bills, and one not stressed nearly enough in most current comment on them, is that 
they would put all States under a 'sixth grade' ceiling of literacy .••• " (Emphasis added.) 
:23 Down to this point, S. 2750 is essentially repetitive of REv. STAT. § 2004 (1875), 
42 U.S.C. § 197l(a) (1958), and raises no new problems. It has been argued that Congress 
is without authority to legislate regarding presidential electors because their selection 
is committed to the state legislatures under art. II, § 1 [See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1 (1892); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 
644 (1938); McGoVNEY 34-35, 160·61.), although the Supreme Court has upheld federal 
laws designed to protect the integrity of the presidential selection process. Burroughs v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). Even assuming 
the inclusion of presidential electors to exceed congressional authority in the context of 
S. 2750, however, so long as registration to qualify to vote for such electors occurs at the 
same time as for Representatives and Senators, lack of "standing" will make it impossible 
for the statute to be invalidated on such grounds. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 
(1960). 
A related question might arise under proposed § 2(b) were private parties to intimidate 
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by law of the right to vote on account of his performance in 
any examination, whether for literacy or otherwise, if such 
other person has not been adjudged incompetent and has 
completed the sixth primary grade of any public school or 
accredited school in any State .... " (Emphasis added.) 
To determine whether this provision conflicts with article I, 
section 2, and the seventeenth amendment (which we will assume 
reserve the power to prescribe voting qualifications to the states), 
we might ask simply whether it forbids a state from requiring 
more, or less, than a sixth-grade education of one who applies to 
register. If it does, most assuredly the power of states to prescribe 
"qualifications" has been trammeled in some measure, and we 
would be obliged to argue that article I, section 2, and the seven-
teenth amendment do not indirectly commit federal elector qual-
ifications exclusively to the states, or at least that they are suffi-
ciently qualified by other provisions24 so as not to invalidate this 
bill. Clearly, however, S. 2750 does not forbid states from requir-
ing less than a sixth-grade education. In fact, neither does it for-
bid them from requiring more. It leaves the degree of qualifica-
tion entirely to the states' discretion and represents only an 
unremarkable exercise of congressional power pursuant to arti-
cle I, section 4. The bases for these conclusions follow. 
A. The Language of the Bill 
The bill does not state, in these or equivalent terms, that a 
"deprivation of the right to vote" would occur if a state disqual-
ified any person because he had no more than a sixth-grade educa-
tion. Nor does it say that a deprivation occurs upon rejection of 
an applicant lacking literacy beyond what can be expected of one 
who has completed six grades at an accredited school. Rather, it 
Negroes from registering in a single registration process for voting in elections for both 
federal and state officers, where their intent was only to deter the Negroes from register-
ing to vote for state officers. Since the power of Congress to reach local elections proceeds 
largely from the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and since these restrict congres-
sional authority to legislating in an appropriate manner only against "state action," 
private intimidation would seem to be beyond congressional reach. Nevertheless, S. 2750 
defines a "federal election" as one held "solely or in part" for the purpose of electing 
federal officers, and thus appears to reach private intimidation of voters for local candi-
dates whenever, as is universally the case, such candidates are to be elected in the same 
election in which federal officers are elected. Dicta from two federal cases suggest that 
where the defendants, though intending to affect only the local election, act in a manner 
which necessarily corrupts the federal election also, or in a manner manifesting reckless 
disregard that their acts may have this incidental effect, they can be reached under federal 
statutes. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); United States v. Nathan, 238 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). 
24 See notes 12, 13, 15 and 16 supra. 
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provides only that, regardless of the degree of literacy required by 
state law, the applicant may not be rejected for failure to demon-
strate that measure of literacy if the means employed to measure 
his literacy involved his performance on some examination. The 
bill is simply a restriction on the manner of determining literacy, 
and not a restriction on the degree of literacy which may be re-
quired. It therefore contemplates the following situations. 
1. State X enacts a statute requiring that all persons wishing 
to register to vote must demonstrate the equivalence of a high 
school education. The statute also provides that the qualification 
can be met upon presentation of a high school diploma, a notarized 
certification by a high school principal that the applicant has com-
pleted high school, or certification by a branch of the United States 
military that the applicant successfully completed the G.E.D. 
program. Although the requisite degree of literacy is higher than 
a sixth-grade education, the means of demonstrating the qualifica-
tion do not involve a performance test administered by a registrar 
or other election official. If applied in an equal fashion to white 
and colored applicants, this state law would not conflict with 
s. 2750. 
2. State Y provides that applicants for registration must dem-
onstrate an understanding of good citizenship. The statutes of 
State Y require that this understanding be demonstrated by re-
sponding correctly to questions pertaining to state government, 
the questions to be posed by each registrar and the answers to be 
judged by each registrar. A, an applicant, applies for registration 
and is asked to interpret a passage from State Y's constitution, in 
satisfaction of the test. Such a procedure involves A's performance 
on an examination for literacy "or otherwise" and would be in-
valid under S. 2750, if A could show that he had completed the 
sixth grade.25 
25 If A has not completed the sixth grade, then he may still be required to take the 
examination. Curiously, this treatment makes it entirely possible for a state to require 
more by way of education, intelligence, and understanding for those lacking a sixth·grade 
education than for those possessing it, because the questions which may be asked of an 
applicant lacking sixth-grade credentials may themselves require far more education in 
order to produce a satisfactory answer than is commonly possessed by a sixth grader. 
Mississippi requires applicants to "demonstrate to the county registrar a reasonable under-
standing of the duties and obligations of citizenship under a constitutional form of govern· 
ment," give a "reasonable interpretation" of any section of the state constitution, and be 
of "good character." Miss. CoNsr. art. 12, § 241-A (Proposed by-laws 1960, ch. 550, ratified 
by electors Nov. 8, 1960, inserted by Proclamation of the Secretary of State, Nov. 23, 1960). 
See also Miss. House Bill 905, of the legislature's 1962 session, in 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 932 
(1962). Louisiana has similar requirements [LA. CoNST. art. VIII, § 1] and adds the require· 
ment that the applicant compute his exact age in years, months, and days, a chore subject 
to disagreement among Louisiana registrars and one which a registrar herself was unable 
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B. The Legislative HistoTy of the Bill 
Proponents of the bill, on the suggestion of the Department 
of Justice, inserted the following remarks in the CongTessional 
Record: 
[Senator Keating]: "I believe that many who have challenged 
the bill's constitutionality have not fully understood its lim-
ited provisions and limited impact .... The argument that 
the States have the power to establish qualifications for voting 
can be conceded without in any way impairing the constitu-
tionality of the bill .... 
"This bill does not overturn any existing literacy qualifica-
tions. If the existing qualification is objective, such as the 
completion of the eighth gmde or third grade, it has no opera-
tion. Only if the existing qualification is subjective, does the 
bill provide a procedure to prevent discrimination against 
electors on the basis of their race."26 
[Senator J avits]: "The means chosen in this particular pro-
posed statute would deny to the giver of a performance test 
for registering and for voting the right or the opportunity to 
utilize that performance test to deny the right to vote if the 
person taking the test holds a sixth grade certificate. 
"That does not mean it is a qualification for voting, Mr. 
President. This is the point which has been constantly, in my 
opinion, confused and obfuscated in this debate. This merely 
would mean that if the performance test is given and if such 
a sixth grade literacy certificate is produced, then the per-
formance test stops at that point."27 
Similarly, the memorandum submitted by the Department of Jus-
tice makes the same point: "Under the bill the States would be 
prohibited from denying the right to vote for Federal officials on 
account of performance on any educational-type examination."28 
to perform. I96I U.S. CoMM'N oN CIVIL RIGHTS REP., bk. I, 56-57. Georgia's "literacy" 
requirement [GA. CoNsr. art. II, § 2-704] has been interpreted by statute to require that 
applicants define a "republican form of government" [GA. CoDE ANN. § 34-ll9 (I962)], a 
task too weighty for the Supreme Court of the United States [See Pacific States Tel. 
&: Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. liS (I9I2); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (2I Wall.) I62 
(I874); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (I868); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 
I (1849).], and subject to a variety of interpretations by political philosophers. See 
AJUSTOTLE, CONSfiTUTION OF ATHENS 60-66 (Hafner ed. 1950); 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CoNsrrrunoN 522-24 (I953); MoNTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 8-I3, I9-22, I20, I26-28 
(Nugent trans!. I949); MoRLEY, FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM (1959); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 
passim (3d ed. Jowett trans!. 1888); THE FEDERALIST 49 (Editor's Introduction) (Wright ed. 
1961); 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 369-70 (Foner ed. 1945); 2 id. at 372-80, 
520. 
26 108 CoNe. REc. 7749 (daily ed. May 15, 1962). (Emphasis added.) 
27 Id. at 7744. (Emphasis added.) 
28 Hearings 303. (Emphasis added.) 
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It is this view of the bill which doubtless lays the foundation for 
the testimony of the Attorney General before the Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights: 
"If they [the states] establish a specific and particular test 
for themselves of a second grade, fourth grade, or eighth 
grade, we do not change that one single bit. They have some 
specific test. 
"It is when they get into an arbitrary area, Mr. Chairman, 
where we come in. So we are not setting qualifications. 
"We are not establishing qualifications. All we are getting 
into is the question of testing of the qualifications .... Now, 
they [the states] can establish any test of their own. If the State 
wants to establish a test, a specific and particular test, that an 
individual complete the eighth grade, for instance, they can 
set up that standard."29 
The full significance of directing the bill to a prohibition of 
performance tests, without restricting the degree of literacy a state 
may require to have demonstrated by other, objective, means, will 
immediately be appreciated from a brief review of the particular 
problem which occasioned the bill. This problem was not that 
states were tending to require unreasonably high standards of 
literacy for their prospective voters generally. Rather, it was that 
the manner of testing certain qualifications committed the fate of 
each applicant to the discretion of the registrar, by allowing the 
registrar to employ subjective tests. The practical difficulties of 
proving abuses under 42 U .S.C. section 197130 were felt to be an 
impediment to insuring that Negroes were treated no differently 
than whites. The point of the bill was to remove the opportunity 
for such ·abuses by forbidding registrars to use subjective tests for 
most voters-those possessing a sixth-grade education. The Civil 
Rights Commission has reported: 
"There are reasonable grounds to believe that substantial 
numbers of Negro citizens are, or recently have been, denied 
the right to vote on grounds of race or color in about 100 
counties in 8 Southern States: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
29 Id. at 271-72. See also id. at 463, 464 (testimony of Joseph Rauh): "I believe the 
Attorney General was correct in his reading of this and, certainly, that is the legislative 
history now, until changed, that a State can still say 'only college graduates.' They can 
still provide an educational test as long as it is an objective test which is not subject to 
the registrar's utilization on a performance basis and, therefore, on a possibly abused 
basis ..•. They can say, as I have said before, that a college education is required, and 
that would not be barred by this bill.'' 
30 Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131, 71 Stat. 637. 
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Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee. Some denials of the right to vote occur by reason 
of discriminatory application of laws setting qualifications 
for voters .... 
"A common technique of discriminating against would-be 
voters on racial grounds involves the discriminatory applica-
tion of legal qualifications for voters. Among the qualifica-
tions used in this fashion ar.e requirements that the voter be 
able to read and write, that he be able to give a satisfactory 
interpretation of the Constitution, that he be able to calculate 
his age to the day, and that he be of 'good character.' " 31 
These findings confirm what the Commission had declared in its 
1959 report,32 and a survey of cases filed under section 1971 will 
make even clearer that it is abuses of discretion by registrars, 
operating under state laws allowing them to test applicants by 
subjective standards, that is felt to be the problem.33 In contrast, 
there is no evidence that states are felt to have set literacy quali-
fications too high, or that a qualification requiring more than a 
sixth-grade education would be a matter for congressional action, 
if the means for determining the qualification did not involve the 
discretion of registrars. 
During the hearings, the question arose as to what difference 
S. 2750 would make, since a registrar could still refuse to register 
an applicant possessing a sixth-grade certificate or equivalent evi-
dence of the state's literacy qualification, and since his refusal 
might result in lengthy litigation as it does under existing section 
1971.34 The answer was that the elimination of variable, subjective 
means of testing qualifications, and the consequent substitution 
of objective referents in measuring qualifications, tend to make 
it harder for registrars covertly to discriminate, easier for appli-
31 1961 U.S. CoMM'N oN CIVIL R.!GIITS REP., bk. 1, 135-37. 
32 1959 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. 133. Other sources, including the Assistant 
Attorney General responsible for enforcement of § 1971, have confirmed these findings. 
See Marshall, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
455, 461 (1962). See also KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 1N STATE AND NATION 576 (1955); Hearings 
610; Heyman, Federal Remedies for Voteless Negroes, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 190, 194 (1960); 
Comment, judicial Protection of Minority Voting Rights: The Case for Constitutional 
Reform, 22 OHio ST. L.J. 390, 391-93 (1961). 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), afj'd, 304 
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, Inc., 196 F. 
Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1961); United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960); 
United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), afj'd sub nom. United States v. 
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960). Other cases of the same character are pending. United States 
v. Penton (M.D. Ala., No. 1741-N); United States v. Lucky (W.D. La., No. 8366); United 
States v. Fox (E.D. La., No. 11625); United States v. Wilder (W.D. La., No. 8695). 
34 Hearings 125 (question by Creech, committee counsel). 
814 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
cants to know when they are being treated differently, and easier 
for the Government to prove its case.35 
This being the answer, it should be obvious that these aims 
are accomplished equally well by restricting the states from 
employing subjective examinations and all other discretionary cri-
teria. These aims do not, on the other hand, require the substitu-
tion of a single, nationwide standard such as a sixth-grade certifi-
cate; they are met if the several states are confined to objective 
means of measuring qualifications, regardless of the level of quali-
fication otherwise required. And this, as the language and back-
ground of S. 2750 indicate, is solely what the bill does.36 To insist 
that it does more is needlessly to ignore its language, to overreach 
the problem, and to assume burdens of constitutional persuasion 
that are not easily carried. 
II. CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF S. 2750 
Wrongly brushed aside as "the flimsiest of foundations,"37 and 
metaphorically maligned as "a very slender reed to stand on,"38 
article I, section 4 is, nevertheless, all that is necessary to sustain 
this bill: 
"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State 
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time 
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 
of chusing Senators." 
If S. 2750 is a regulation concerning the "manner of holding 
[federal] Elections," it is within the congressional prerogative. 
Part of the problem is disposed of quickly. S. 2750 is limited to 
federal elections by its own terms, and does not affect the manner 
of holding elections for state officers, except to the extent that the 
35 Id. at 125, 264, 465-66. See also 1961 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., bk. 1, 137, 
and materials cited at note 32 supra. 
36 In only one minor respect does the language of S. 2750 go beyond the problem 
which occasioned it. Since the bill forbids the use of all performance examinations, it 
appears to exclude the use of standardized objective tests, scored by machine, with a 
stated percentage of correct responses required for qualification. The use of such tests 
carries a minimal risk of registrar manipulation, especially if test results are processed 
by an independent contractor having no knowledge of the race or color of the applicants 
whose tests are being scored. They would be no more offensive than the use of other 
objective means of testing applicants allowed by the bill, e.g., presentation of a sixth· 
grade certificate. Arguably, by hedging on the language of S. 2750 and by relying on the 
bill's legislative background, such tests might still be allowable (see note 29 supra), and 
the law could be interpreted as outlawing discretionary tests only. 
37 Maggs &: Wallace, supra note 15, at 519. 
38 Hearings 133 (remarks of Dean Griswold). 
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state itself decides to combine local registration and elections with 
the federal process.39 Since S. 2750 does not presume to regulate 
local elections per se, unlike other bills which failed to reach the 
Senate floor,40 there is consequently no need to borrow from other 
sections of the Constitution which may allow such local regulation. 
The second issue is whether a federal law affecting the registra-
tion process prerequisite to voting for federal officers comes within 
the power to regulate the "manner of holding elections." Is the 
registration process so remote from, or anterior to, the holding of 
an election so as not to be, constitutionally, a part of the overall 
election? An abundance of judicial dicta and holdings in analogous 
situations make clear that the federal power to regulate elections 
extends equally to the registration processY Any matter affecting 
the character or choice of the federal electorate is so integrally re-
lated to the election ultimately held as to come within the "hold-
ing" of the election under article I, section 4. The section is thus 
fairly interpreted for purposes here as though it provided: "Con-
gress may at any time by law make or alter regulations affecting 
the manner of registration." 
Finally, the issue which remains is whether the outlawing of 
so See discussion in note 23 supra. 
40 See, e.g., S. 480, reproduced in Hearings 7, and see recommendations of the Com· 
mission in 1961 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., bk. 1, 139-42. 
41 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932): "It cannot be doubted that these com-
prehensive words [those of art. I, § 4] embrace authority to provide for a complete code 
for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, 
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, ..• to enact the numerous require-
ments as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to 
enforce the fundamental right involved .••. The phrase 'such regulations' plainly refers 
to regulation of the same general character that the legislature of the State is authorized 
to prescribe with respect to congressional elections." (Emphasis added.) 
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), sustained a Reconstruction statute providing 
for the attendance of federal supervisors at registration places, on the basis of art. I, 
§ 4. For other cases indicating that "elections" in § 4 include any step in the selection 
of winning congressional candidates, see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); 
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). See also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 
534 (19.34); Dummit v. O'Connell, 298 Ky. 44, 181 S.W.2d 691 (1944). By way of analogy, 
other sections of the Constitution employing the word "vote" or "chosen," without 
express mention of "registration," have been held to sustain federal laws applied to the 
registration process. United States v. Association of Citizens Councils, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 
908 (W.D. La. 1961); United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960); United 
States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Thomas, 
.362 U.S. 58 (1960). Indeed, the several "elections" sections of the Constitution provide 
ample bases for congressional prQtection of electoral integrity anterior to registration 
[United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961)], and extending even to a private, 
pre-primary (Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)]. Any construction of § 4 making it 
inapplicable to the registration process would make it possible for the states to prevent 
congressional elections by requiring registration and then refusing to provide how, when, 
or where, registration should take place-a possibility § 4 was intended to foreclose. See 
5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 326, 401-02, 535 (2d ed. 1941); 2 id. at 23, 326; THE FEDERALIST 
No. 59, at .394-95 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton). 
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performance examinations goes to the "manner" of qualifying 
to vote, as distinct from the "qualifications" themselves, which 
are still assumed to be reserved to the states under article I, sec-
tion 2. If the bill means what has previously been suggested, it 
doubtless goes to "manner" alone. 
A conservative distinction between the two is that "manner" 
goes only to the "how" of determining voters, rather than to the 
"who" they shall be, or to "what" it is they must possess by way 
of qualification.42 A "qualification" may fairly be described as an 
attribute one must possess, while the various means by which one 
may demonstrate that he has such an attribute concern the man-
ner in which he establishes it. Thus, the attributes of a prospective 
voter, whether they encompass length of residence, absence of a 
criminal record, good moral character, or degree of literacy, may 
properly be styled as voter "qualifications." The myriad ways in 
which these attributes may be demonstrated go to the manner of 
proving them. 
It should now be recalled that S. 2750 does not require registra-
tion applicants to possess a sixth-grade education, nor does it for-
bid states from requiring more than a sixth-grade education. It 
leaves the states free to require any degree of education, intelligence, 
or good citizenship they desire, and it restricts the manner in which 
the state may require proof only by condemning the use of per-
formance examinations. It is to be recalled, too, that it forbids the 
use of this particular means of testing qualifications as an entirely 
reasonable precaution against demonstrated abuses which, as 
ample research discloses, inhere in the registration process of states 
which employ performance examinations.43 In this connection, it 
is abundantly clear that article I, section 4, was designed at least 
to permit Congress to protect the integrity of its own selection 
process, so long as it did not set aside or alter the qualifications 
of the electors.44 In the discharge of this power, S. 2750 is much 
42 108 CoNG. R.Ec. 6678 (daily ed. April 26, 1962) (remarks of Senator Johnston of 
South Carolina); 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 71 (2d ed. 1941); THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 395 
(Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton). See also 108 CoNG. R.Ec. 6664 (daily ed. April 26, 1962). 
Compare the relatively extravagant claim for congressional power under this section made 
by Professor Crosskey (1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 524-36 (1953)), with 2 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES 50-51, 438-39 (2d ed. 1941); 5 id. 377-86; McGQVNEY 160-62; PADOVER, To SECURE 
THESE BLESSINGS 239-43 (1962); THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 360 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamil-
ton); id. No. 60, at 402 (Hamilton). Additionally, congressional debate on the fifteenth 
amendment suggests that voters' qualifications were regarded as beyond congressional 
alteration. See CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1301-05 (1869). 
43 See text at notes 31-33 supra. 
44 See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); 
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See also 
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like the Reconstruction statute empowering the appointment of 
federal registration supervisors to inspect registration procedures 
and to challenge certain registration practices, a statute upheld 
in Ex parte Siebold:45 
"The due and fair election of these representatives is of vital 
importance to the United States. The government of the 
United States is no less concerned in the transaction than the 
State government is. It certainly is not bound to stand by as 
a passive spectator, when duties are violated and outrageous 
frauds are committed .... " 46 
"The counsel for the petitioners concede that Congress 
may, if it sees fit, assume the entire control and regulation of 
the election of representatives . . . and every other matter 
relating to the subject."47 
The bill is also no different in principle from section 1974,48 
which requires registrars to maintain records for a period of 
twenty-two months to enable federal agents to inspect these rec-
ords as a check against discriminatory practices; both bills some-
what limit registrars from giving certain tests or disposing of cer-
tain records, but neither obviously affects voter qualifications as 
such. S. 2750 is also in line with the Corrupt Practices Act,49 up-
held in Burroughs v. United States on grounds far broader than 
are needed here.uo S. 2750 comes equally within the rationale of 
Ex parte Yarbrough.51 
2 ELLIOT's D£BA'rES 22-23, 326, 535 (2d ed. 1941); 4 id. 401-02; THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 
394-95 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton); McGoVNEY 162. 
45 100 u.s. 371 (1879). 
46 I d. at 388. 
47 Id. at 396. 
48 Civil Rights Act of 1960, §§ 301-06, 74 Stat. 88. 
40 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-56 (1958). 
110 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934): "The power of Congress to protect the election of 
President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that 
end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress. If it can be 
seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of necessity, 
the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between 
the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination 
alone." For a rationale supporting the belief that the Supreme Court will sustain con-
gressional exercises of constitutional authority beyond an interpretation which the judi· 
ciary might otherwise give to the self-executing effect of such authority, see Wechsler, 
Tlze Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUJI!. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954). That S. 2750 
would be treated sympathetically by the Court, see letter by Professor Sutherland, 
Hearings 627·31. 
fil 110 U.S. 651 (1884). "If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation 
of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the 
general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its exist-
ence depends from violence and corruption •.•• " Id. at 657-58. 
"[T]he importance to the general government of having the actual election-the 
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There is, to be sure, a theoretical penumbral conflict between 
sections 2 and 4 of article I, and to that extentS. 2750 necessarily 
represents a slight hedging. The conflict amounts to this: since 
Congress is empowered to restrict the means of measuring whether 
an applicant possesses a certain qualification, it is theoretically 
possible that such a power might be employed so extensively as 
effectively to eliminate the requirement for the qualification it-
self. Note what becomes of a state's power to require literacy, for 
instance, should Congress provide that the manner of establishing 
proof of literacy may not include any of the following: a subjec-
tive test; an objective test; a diploma or certificate; a statement 
by a teacher, principal, or other educator; a statement by an 
employer, neighbor, or any other person; or any other means. 
In flexing its power to regulate the "manner" of proving qualifica-
tions so as to foreclose the states from all feasible means of requir-
ing a qualification to be proved, Congress could effectively disable 
the states from requiring the qualification itself. 
Nevertheless, the penumbral overlap . of qualifications and 
manner of proving them will scarcely upset the constitutionality 
of S. 2750; by itself, the bill leaves the power to require literacy 
qualifications relatively untrammeled, reserving to the states a 
number of feasible means of testing the requisite degree of liter-
acy.52 Moreover, the problem caused by the overlap of sections 2 
and 4, as here construed, does not argue against the construction 
urged. That the power to regulate the "manner" might be abused, 
so as to upset state control over voting, was contemplated at the 
time section 2 was ratified; the prospect was not regarded as serious 
enough to warrant excision or amendment of either section.53 
voting for those members-free from force and fraud is not diminished by the circum-
stances that the qualification of the voter is determined by the law of the State where 
he votes. It equally affects the government, it is as indispensable to the proper discharge 
of the great function of legislating for that government, that those who are to control 
this legislation shall not owe their election to bribery or violence, whether the class of 
persons who shall vote is determined by the law of the State, or by the law of the 
United States, or by their united result." Id. at 663. See also In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 
532 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). 
52 E.g., by means of an oath, presentation of a diploma or of a certificate signed 
by a school principal, an affidavit from a teacher that the applicant has successfully 
completed such-and-such course in civics, or even the use of a standardized, objective, 
machine-scored test, as suggested in note 36 supra. 
53 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 23, 27, 30, 438-39, 535 (2d ed. 1941); 5 id. at 401·02. 
A better answer, perhaps, is that such an "abuse" would be subject to judicial review 
and risk invalidation by the Supreme Court, although this safeguard may not have been 
recognized when the Constitution was adopted, since the doctrine of judicial supremacy 
crystallized somewhat later. Still another way of rebutting the argument is to reverse 
the dilemma: if Congress lacks authority to regulate the manner of testing qualifications 
so as to insure the integrity of the election, then the unbridled power of the states to 
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The current difficulty is not the result of a strained construction 
of the two sections, but of a conflict fully anticipated and not 
especially feared. As Congress focuses its attention more and more 
on the "manner" of holding federal elections, we may expect the 
courts to resolve any conflict with section 2 state powers in the 
same common-sense fashion as they have resolved similar conflicts 
elsewhere in the law. 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF s. 2750 
WhileS. 2750 is doubtless constitutional, it is really a most un-
promising half-step toward broadening the franchise and protect-
ing it from racial discrimination. Indeed, in one respect the law 
would inadvertently legalize some registration practices which are 
today unlawful. Under 42 U.S.C. section 1971, a state registrar 
may not now require subjective tests of some applicants and not 
of others; where it can be shown that the registrar administers the 
subjective test more often to Negroes than he does to whites, in-
junctive relief can be obtained.54 Under S. 2750, however, the 
registrar might lawfully require subjective tests of some applicants, 
that is, those lacking a sixth-grade education, even though not 
using them in connection with all other applicants. If relatively 
more Negroes than whites do not have a sixth-grade education, the 
statute contemplates that proportionately more Negroes than 
whites may lawfully be subjected to discretionary tests-a depar-
ture from what is currently permitted. 
The fact of the matter is that in the worst-offending states fifty 
percent of all Negroes over twenty-five years of age lack a sixth-
grade education.55 In contrast, the median educational attainment 
for white persons twenty-five years or older, in these same states, 
is above the tenth-grade level. 56 This disparity in median educa-
tional achievement between whites and Negroes necessarily means 
prescribe qualifications could be used to corrupt the national government-a prospect 
Hamilton employed to demonstrate the necessity for art. I, § 4. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 
394 (\V'right ed. 1961) (Hamilton). 
54 The result follows from subsections (a) and (c) of § 1971. See, e.g., cases cited in 
note 33 supra. 
155 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, GENERAL, SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY 1-260, Final Report PC(l)-IC (1962). The 
"worst offending states" include Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina. They are so designated because they are among the eight states in which the 
Civil Rights Commission determined that substantially all significant instances of voter 
discrimination occur. 1961 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., bk. 1., 5, 22. 
56 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 55. 
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that S. 2750 would permit the subjective testing of relatively more 
Negroes than whites. 
The sixth-grade cut-off feature of the bill is therefore most 
regrettable, especially in view of the very problem which occa-
sioned the bill's proposal. It will be recalled that this problem 
resulted from the wholesale application of subjective tests to Negro 
applicants generally, and not merely from their application to 
Negroes having a sixth-grade education. Indeed, there is no evi-
dence that Negroes having a sixth-grade education were treated 
any worse than other Negroes. In response to the problem, Con-
gress should, as it may pursuant to article I, section 4, eliminate 
the use of all such tests entirely, and require that states assess voter 
qualifications by other means less subject to abuse. In permitting 
subjective tests to be used for all persons lacking a sixth-grade 
education, the bill would inadvertently result in the following 
consequences: (a) fifty percent of the Negroes of voting age in 
states most likely to discriminate against them will still be subject 
to discretionary tests; (b) a higher proportion nf Negroes than of 
whites may lawfully be required to take such tests; (c) white-
dominated legislatures will have an additional incentive to make 
subjective literacy tests more rigorous, knowing that relatively 
few white persons will be required to take these tests; (d) persons 
lacking a sixth-grade education may need to possess a higher degree 
of "literacy" in order to register than would persons having, but 
having only, a sixth-grade education.57 
In view of these anomalies, one might wonder why the sixth-
grade limitation was put into the bill. The reason is not difficult 
to state, but it is impossible to defend. The sixth-grade cut-off was 
ostensibly established on the premise that it accurately reflects an 
educational standard above which virtually all persons are literate 
but below which a significantly increasing number are not. In one 
sense, this theory is defensible. Over ninety-eight percent of all 
persons who have completed the sixth grade are "literate," as that 
term is defined by the United States Census Bureau.58 But use of 
57 The explanation for this bizarre result, that Negroes lacking a sixth-grade educa· 
tion will have to demonstrate a greater degree of "literacy" to register than will those 
possessing a sixth-grade education, is elaborated in note 25 supra. 
58 Recent census surveys have assumed that 100% of the population having a sixth· 
grade education are literate, because earlier surveys, in which census-takers inquired 
specifically of literacy, disclosed that virtually all having a sixth-grade education passed 
the test. The assumption appears to be warranted, inasmuch as all persons not having 
completed the sixth grade continue to be polled as to literacy by the Census Bureau, 
and the 1950 census indicates that, of those having completed five grades of schooling, 
only 1.3% of white persons over fourteen and 1.9% of non-white persons over fourteen 
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the Census Bureau's definition of "literacy," in the context of 
S. 2750, is wholly illogical. Literacy, as defined for census purposes, 
embraces only the ability to read and write a simple message.59 
Literacy as used inS. 2750 is concerned not only with those who 
may be asked by registrars to read and write a simple message, 
but with those who may be asked to interpret complicated sections 
of state constitutions, to determine their age exactly in terms of 
years, months, and days, or to demonstrate good citizenship.60 
S. 2750 outlaws subjective tests for "literacy or otherwise" for per-
sons having a sixth-grade education; it does not outlaw only those 
subjective tests which confine themselves to determining whether an 
applicant can read and write a simple message. There is, of course, 
no data to support a claim that even fifty percent of the popula-
tion possessing a sixth-grade education could pass the type of tests 
employed by the worst-offending states.61 It is therefore arbitrary 
to exempt those with a sixth-grade, or greater, education from tests 
they are hardly more likely to pass than are those with lesser educa-
tional accomplishments.62 
What has been said, however, by no means supports an 
argument that some higher cut-off should have been used. It be-
comes necessary to employ a cut-off only if Congress desires ac-
tually to restrict the power of states to set literacy qualifications, 
are illiterate. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SER. P-20, 
No. 45, PoPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, Table 19, at 23 (1953). 
150 Id. at 9-10: "In 1952, as in past censuses and surveys, persons who could not both 
read and write a simple message either in English or any other language were classified 
as illiterate. Thus, illiterates include persons who are able to read but not write. Persons 
who formerly knew how to read but who were unable to do so at the time of the survey 
because of mental or physical impairment, such as blindness, are classified as literate." The 
same minimum definition is used by the United Nations. See UNITED NATIONS, PoPULATION 
CoMMISSION, REPoRT OF THE THIRD SESSION 25 (Lake Success 1948); UNESCO, WoRLD 
ILLITERACY AT MID·CENTURY: A STATISTICAL STUDY 19 (Monographs on Fundamental 
Education-XI, 1957); UNESCO, EXPERT COMMITTEE ON STANDARDIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL 
STATISTICS, REPORT 3 (Paris 1952). 
60 See note 25 supra. 
61 That is, the fact that virtually all persons completing the sixth grade can read 
and write a simple message (the Census Bureau's standard of "literacy') is no guarantee 
at all that the same persons could give a reasonable interpretation of any section of the 
Mississippi constitution, compute their age in years, months, and days, or satisfactorily 
define a "republican form of government," all of which are required by various perform-
ance tests among several Southern states. See note 25 supra. 
62 Indeed, a Negro lacking a sixth·grade education, and asked by a registrar to 
define a republican form of government in order to qualify to vote, .might argue that, 
in the face of S. 2750, such a demand tends to deny him the equal protection of the laws 
under the fourteenth amendment. His argument would rest on the supportable claim 
that persons no more likely than he, with respect to their ability to respond to such a 
demand, are exempted under S. 2750; consequently, the application of subjective tests 
of this kind only to persons lacking a sixth-grade education rests on a classification 
which is arbitrary. 
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a task not attempted in S. 2750, not required by the problem it 
seeks to solve, and one which would in fact raise serious constitu-
tional issues. Should Congress forbid states from requiring more 
by way of literacy than the ability to read and write a simple mes-
sage, it would be making a judgment of policy that any qualifica-
tion more stringent than that proposed has no rational connection 
with an individual's ability to cast an informed vote and, on this 
basis, more stringent qualifications must not be allowed. But, as 
has been indicated, S. 2750 does not forbid states from requiring 
. educational attributes far beyond the ability to read and write a 
simple message. Rather, it leaves each state free to decide for itself 
the level of requisite intelligence, and it provides only that, what-
ever the level of qualification required may be, the states may not 
employ subjective tests in determining whether a given applicant 
possesses the qualification. Since states are not restricted from re-
quiring an eighth-grade education, or even a college education, 
legislation which simply eliminates the use of subjective tests has 
no occasion to consider what degree of literacy voters ought to 
have were a single, nationwide standard being enacted. Thus, the 
sixth-grade cut-off feature of the bill serves no legitimate purpose 
and it otherwise would tend to aggravate the vices which have re-
sulted from state requirements measured by subjective tests.63 
Short of an amendment to the Constitution, or additional fed-
eral legislation unlikely to find favor with Congress as it is pres-
ently constituted, these other varieties of discrimination can be 
met only through piecemeal litigation under existing laws.64 S. 2750 
is thus no more than a short thread in the ravelled history of the 
franchise. It would effect no great change in electoral power any-
where in America, and, without some alteration, its enactment 
would be of doubtful value. The temporary failure of a bill of 
such modest proportions reflects ruefully on our egalitarian com-
mitments. As we were among the last civilized nations to abandon 
slavery, so it seems we are to be among the last to remove its final 
vestiges as well. 
63 A classic report canvassing the varieties of discriminatory devices available to 
registrars is contained in TAPER, GOMILLION VERSUS LIGHTFOOT (1962). See also United 
States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), affd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962); 
United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), afj'd sub nom. United States v. 
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960). 
64 The current program of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department is 
described in Marshall, supm note 32, and reviewed favorably in Bickel, Civil Rights, 
The New Republic, Dec. 15, 1962, p. Il. At the same time, President Kennedy has made 
the Justice Department's task more difficult by making some hostile appointments to the 
Southern federal bench. See Bickel, supra at 16. The responsibility is not entirely shifted 
by considerations of senatorial courtesy alone. See CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT! OFFICE AND 
POWERS 73-75, 361-67 (4th ed. 1957). 
